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"Anything Rather Than a Deliberate and
Well-Considered Opinion"-Henry Lord
Brougham, Written by Himself
FRED C. ZACHARIAS* AND BRUCE

A.

GREEN**

In Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, we compared two standard conceptions of advocacy ethics and offered a third alternative.' The first standard
conception is commonly traced to Henry Lord Brougham's statement in
Parliament in 1820 about Queen Caroline'sCase:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons... is his first and only
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments,
the destruction which he may bring upon others.2
The other stems from David Hoffman's contemporaneous Resolutions in Regard
to Professional Deportment and places a higher premium on lawyers' personal
consciences as determinants of lawyers' conduct.3 We suggested a middle-ground
that helps explain anomalous decisions by courts to impose duties that appear
inconsistent with the modem professional codes.4
Monroe Freedman has written an essay first criticizing our reliance on an 1845
opinion by Justice John Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and then
challenging one half of one sentence in our article which notes, in passing, that
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(2005).
2. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1821). Brougham made this statement while defending Queen Caroline
against charges of treason in political proceedings in the House of Lords. As Brougham later acknowledged, his
speech was not meant as a learned disquisition on the trial advocate's role, but as a veiled threat to reveal
embarrassing information about the King should the proceeding go forward.
3. 2 DAVID HoFFMAN, Resolutions in Regard to ProfessionalDeportment, in A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY
752-75 (William S. Hein & Co. 1968) (1846).
4. Zacharias & Green, supra note 1, at 4-6. Professor Freedman suggests that the conception we propose
simply reflects a truism that lawyers should act zealously within the bounds of the ethics rules and other law.
Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL EIcs
1213, 1213 & n.6
(2006). As our article discusses at length, the alternative conception that we identify with Justice Gibson's 1845
reference to "professional conscience" presupposes restrictions on advocacy that go well beyond those
explicitly set forth in the law. See Zacharias & Green, supranote 1, at 21-36.
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Lord Brougham repudiated his statement about advocacy later in his career.5 We
respond briefly simply to suggest that the first criticism is misguided and that the
second is unpersuasive.
We did indeed rely on Justice Gibson's opinion in Rush v. Cavenaugh,6 which
suggested that professional regulation of lawyers is based on lawyers' "professional conscience"-as distinct from personal conscience. The opinion was
deemed important at the time, and Gibson's opinions in other fields have been
highly influential. Professor Freedman, however, intimates that we have encouraged our readers to honor Gibson and dishonor Brougham and that this is
unwarranted because Gibson once wrote a decision forecasting the United States
Supreme Court's infamous Dred Scott decision, while Brougham was an
abolitionist.7 Our article did not hold Gibson up as a moral authority, as
Freedman maintains, but only as an influential jurist whose opinion on
professional regulation is worth revisiting. The question of slavery-and for that
matter, the question of Gibson's and Brougham's relative distinction-had
nothing to do with our thesis.
The rest of Professor Freedman's essay is directed at the passing reference in
our article to Brougham's subsequent repudiation of his pronouncement about
legal advocacy, which Freedman characterizes as "an error."S Our observation
derived from an introspective letter Brougham wrote in 1859 that stated, "I wish
to mention to you, in reference to... my statement in the Queen's case ....that
the statement was anything rather than a deliberate and well-considered
opinion."9 John R. Dos Passos, a well-respected nineteenth century scholar, t°
characterized Brougham's letter as a repudiation, and we cited Dos Passos's
book. l"

5. Freedman, supra note 4.
6. 2 Pa. 187 (1845).
7. Freedman, supra note 4, at 1214.
8. Id. at 1213.
9. WILIAM FORSYTH, THE HISTORY OF LAWYERS ANcIEr AND MODERN 380 n.1 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.
1998) (1875) (quoting an 1859 letter from Henry Lord Brougham) (emphasis added).
10. Dos Passos was a practicing lawyer who "took time to study the legal profession and to write about the
responsibilities of lawyers." Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional
Responsibility, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 159 (2006). His book on the American legal profession continues
to be cited as authority today. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1,
32 n.91, 50 n.172 (1988); Erik M. Jensen, A Law Unto Itself.- The Untold Story of the Law Firm Sullivan and
Cromwell, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.133, 160 n.139 (book review).
11. JOHN R. Dos PAssos, THE AMRIcAN LAWYER: As HE WAS-As HE Is-As HE CAN BE 142-43 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1986) (1907); Zacharias & Green, supra note 1, at 2 n.3. Other scholars have expressed similar
doubts about whether Brougham's pronouncement reflected his personal belief in the extreme conception of
advocacy. See, e.g., James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A. 's 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv.
2395, 2443 & n.272 (2003) ("Lord Brougham commented later that the absolute loyalty to the client articulated
in his speech was 'not so much a statement of [a lawyer's] duty as it was a political threat."') (quoting L. Ray
Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909 (1980)); Michael I. Krauss, The
Lawyer as Limo: A Brief History of the Hired Gun, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 325, 332 (2001) ("Lord
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In truth, Brougham's state of mind late in life had little significance for us. Our
article starts from the proposition that Brougham's original position reflects a
conception of advocacy on which many lawyers continue to rely, so it does not
matter whether Brougham believed what he said and for how long. Brougham's
repudiation is, at most, a tangential issue.
But even taking Professor Freedman's argument on its own terms, the evidence
is not nearly as persuasive as Freedman believes. Most obviously, there seems to
be little reason not to accept the 1859 letter at face value. Brougham's concession
that his 1820 statement "was anything rather than a deliberate and wellconsidered opinion" surely sounds like a repudiation, not an endorsement, of the
earlier pronouncement.
In arguing on Queen Caroline's behalf, Brougham advanced her cause by
threatening to disclose information embarrassing to the crown. 12 Professor
Freedman reasons that because Brougham's 1859 letter did not express regret for
making this political threat and because making the threat was consistent with the
extreme view of an advocate's role that Brougham used to justify the threat in his
speech, the letter must be a reaffirmation of Brougham's original view of
advocacy. This, however, ignores the possibility that Brougham stood by his
actions without attempting to endorse, more generally, the separate statement
about advocacy that accompanied them. Brougham may have come to believe
of the
that his threat was justified under different, or more moderate, conceptions
13
advocate's role (or without regard to one's view of an advocate's role).
Professor Freedman looks for support in Brougham's 1871 autobiographythat is, to Brougham's own words-as evidence that he did not repudiate his
original view.1 4 Professor Freedman's argument appears to be that because
Brougham repeats language from his speech in a footnote in the autobiography,
he must have meant every word of it in 1820, in 1871, and at every point between.
But the footnote is not a reaffirmation of the original speech. It includes no
reflection upon, much less a normative endorsement of, Brougham's earlier
Brougham's dictum is routinely taken out of context. Brougham never advocated 'hired gunship'-he simply
said he would stand up to political power when his client was in the right.").
12. See supra note 2.
13. Arguably, advocacy ethics had no bearing on Brougham's conduct since he was speaking in a political,
not a judicial, forum. A lawyer-politician acting on a political stage may not be bound by an advocate's duties to
the judicial process.
Moreover, even if the proceedings were judicial in nature, Brougham's concession that his legal argument
had the client-centered aim of posing a political threat militates against the conclusion that the speech reflected
Brougham's personal views. Adversary ethics have always included the core proposition that arguments made
in the course of advocacy should not be taken as expressions of the lawyer's personal opinion-indeed, that
advocates ordinarily should avoid expressing their personal opinion in the course of argument. See, e.g., MODEL
RuLES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.2(b) (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("A lawyer's representation of a
client... does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities."); MODEL RuLEs R. 3.4(e) (forbidding trial lawyers to "state a personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused..
14. Freedman, supra note 4, at 1217-18.
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beliefs about the role of lawyers. The footnote purports to be no more than a
direct quote of Brougham's words in the House of Lords-just a recollection of
what Brougham previously had said. 15
Finally, there may be more significance than Professor Freedman acknowledges to the fact that Brougham's autobiography recounts the Queen Caroline
speech differently from the way it traditionally has been reported. Most historical
accounts quote the speech as proclaiming that the advocate's obligation to the
client is "his first and only duty." The autobiography states that the advocate's
obligation to the client "is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties"'6 _
implying that the advocate also owes duties to others. If Brougham meant exactly
what he wrote in his autobiography, as Professor Freedman maintains, this
difference would be significant. One would have to conclude that Brougham
recognized the existence of secondary duties that the speech, as reported, did not
acknowledge. Interestingly, this modified position on the lawyer's role would
neatly fit the thesis of our article that lawyers' duties to their clients are limited by
other obligations not codified in the law and professional rules.17
In the end, however, the accuracy of the reporting of Brougham's speech,
whether John Dos Passos or Monroe Freedman is right about Brougham's
so-called "repudiation," and how "deliberate and well-considered" Brougham
ultimately believed his pronouncement concerning advocacy to be all are minor
issues. We share Professor Freedman's recognition of Brougham's speech (as
traditionally reported) as an influential encapsulation of one conception of the
advocate's role. Brougham's pronouncement found a receptive audience in this
country and continues to have life almost two centuries later. Its normative
validity, rather than Brougham's regret or lack thereof, is what we addressed in
our article and is what should engage the professional responsibility community
today.

15. 2 HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, WRFrEN BY HIMsELF

308-09 n. (1871).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. There is a second difference that may be significant, but less so. Brougham's speech said that a lawyer
"knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client." 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, supra note 2,
at 8. The autobiography emphasizes that the lawyer knows but one person: "THAT CLIENT AND NONE
OTHER." BROUGHAM, supra note 14, at 309 n. This sentence precedes the sentence referring to the lawyer's
"duties."
In the original version, the reference to one client and one duty suggested that the lawyer's role is simple and
unambiguous. The more nuanced modified version, however, suggests that Brougham may have meant to
confine his first observation to duties among clients and his second to other duties that may exist-for example
to the public or the legal system. This interpretation is supported by the historical fact that, before pleading
Queen Caroline's case on the floor of the House of Lords, Brougham vacillated in his representation of Caroline.
He at times appeared to curry the favor of government officials and at times appeared to serve his own interests.
ROBERT STEWART, HENRY BROUGHAM 1778-1868: HIs PuBLIc CAREER 145-46 (1986). There thus may have been
some question as to which client he truly served, which the first sentence resolved-a resolution that did not
eliminate the possibility that Brougham recognized other, potentially supervening duties.

